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an ordering of data essential to scientific endeavor. On this score alone, *The Politics of the Developing Areas* is an outstanding contribution to political science.

LEON D. EPSTEIN

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Contemporary Theory in International Relations. EDITED BY STANLEY H. HOFFMANN. (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1960. Pp. x, 293. \$4.95).

Few practitioners, or even scholars, realize how extensive the material bearing on theories of international relations has become. Significant contributions have been made from many quarters. Some of these have been presented in well-known books, such as E. H. Carr's *The Twenty Years' Crisis* (London: Macmillan, 1939) and Hans J. Morgenthau's *Politics Among Nations* (New York: Knopf, 1948), but most of the essentially theoretical studies have appeared in professional journals of limited circulation or in obscure and little read monographs. In recent months, however, several very useful collections of materials relating to theories of international relations have been published. Perhaps the best of these is the volume edited by Stanley H. Hoffmann.

The title is misleading. Few of the selections are really significant theoretical contributions. Most of them are *approaches* to a theory or theories of international relations, or methodological essays, overlaid with a series of critical prefatory comments by the editor. According to Professor Hoffmann, "the main contemporary theories of international relations" are the "realist" theory of power politics, which he identifies with Professor Morgenthau, philosophies of history, such as those expressed over the years by Professor Toynbee, "systems theory," whose chief exponent in the field of international relations is Morton Kaplan (this theory often leads to the development of mathematical models and to the theory of games of strategy), George Liska's equilibrium theory, and the decision-making approach to the study of international politics, identified chiefly with Richard C. Snyder. Professor Hoffmann holds that the "realist" theory reduces the study of international relations "to a formalized ballet," is "too static," and has only a "limited" usefulness "as a general theory for the discipline" (p. 35). Philosophies of history end "in the sky, not in a theory for international relations" (p. 39). "Systems theory" "springs from a misunderstanding of the natural sciences" (p. 42), "uses totally inappropriate techniques" (p. 44), "involves some fantastic assumptions" (p. 45),

and is at best "a huge misstep in the right direction" (p. 40). The equilibrium theory "is both too broad and too narrow to serve as a useful central tool" (p. 51). The decision-making approach "might be right for foreign-policy analysis, but it is too weak for the rest of international relations" (p. 53).

Having cheerfully conducted what he calls frankly "a wrecking operation," Professor Hoffmann turns from "theories" to "suggestions." A statement on the jacket of the book claims that he "offers an original program of systematic research for the future." In fact, what he does is to suggest two directions of research, emphasizing historical sociology and the relation between political philosophy and international problems. These are useful suggestions, but they are not "original," nor do they provide a "program of systematic research." The excellent selections from Raymond Aron, Herbert Kelman, Ernst B. Haas, Arnold Wolfers, and E. H. Carr, which are included in this section of the book, are reminders that significant work is already being done in these two fields.

The selections in this volume are indicative of the progress that has been made in the study of international relations, and, even though they do not add up to a theory, they illustrate significant approaches with which every student of the subject should be familiar. Unhappily, many of the leading contributors to the field, some of whom are represented in this collection, are writing in an almost unintelligible jargon. They would do well to heed this gentle reminder of Professor Wolfers: "Sometimes the scientifically minded scholar of today may turn out to be merely more pedantic in his formulations and less afraid of belaboring the obvious" (p. 243). The selections by Raymond Aron, Wolfers, and E. H. Carr are evidence that it is possible to combine profundity of thought with intelligibility of expression and grace of style. This is a lesson which many contemporary students of international affairs have not yet learned.

NORMAN D. PALMER

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The Political Economy of National Security. BY JAMES R. SCHLESINGER. (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Inc. 1960. ix, 292. \$5.00).

In a world in which the United States cannot hope to devise absolute security, choices on national security issues are choices among hazards. Risking, as they do, the welfare and defense of our body politic, they are *ipso facto* political choices. Professor Schlesinger states

in his introduction that professional advice, either military or economic, can only cast a light on policy; it cannot determine it. He undertakes to bring together "all of the major security issues confronting the West in the area of economic policy." In so doing he criticizes the frequent misrepresentation of economic analysis as a justification for past and present policies. He particularly questions the stress which has been given to the importance of economic growth and of economic potential. Most readers will feel he has added to the usefulness of his book by also raising challenging questions about the soundness of some existent policies.

The first half of the book discusses the application of the tools of economic analysis to resource allocation for national security, the strategic meaning today of economic capacity, some discussion on management of our economy in a military emergency, and problems of our national security budget. The author develops a sound case for the utility of the marginal analysis approach in weighting resource costs and in choosing among alternative strategies and implementing programs. Like Klaus Knorr in *War Potential of Nations*, he emphasizes the importance of qualitative aspects of economic capacity—flexibility, structure and real rate of output growth.

Professor Schlesinger has not given a completely comprehensive discussion of all the problems that might reasonably fall under his title, nor could any author be expected to do so in a book of this length. He gives scant attention to indirect stabilization controls and to problems of mobilizing resources in an emergency. He does not deal with organizational and administrative problems or with the related problem of the political economy of alliances. Nor is the impact of scientific and technological advances on both military requirements and policy given the emphasis and analysis it deserves from the author's standpoint.

The second half of the book consists of an epilogue entitled *Common Sense in the Contemporary Power Struggle* and a discussion of three topics: international trade, the economic growth of the USSR and its implications for U. S. security, and the related problems of economic growth and political stability in underdeveloped countries. The author's discussion of the last topic puts him in a thought-stimulating argument with the approach to development and economic assistance often associated with Professors Rostow and Millikan of MIT. He does not examine the program having the most complicated integration

of security, political and economic considerations—the military assistance program.

The strategy of security presented in the book suggests that we accept that the West lives in an increasingly hostile world and that Communism will advance in Asia. This probable eventuality is viewed with some equanimity. "Our international goal should be the limited one of achieving security for both ourselves and allied Western nations if possible." This is a sort of Atlantic Community isolationism. "The road to Paris lies through Bonn and Sedan; if the West remains strong there is no other path. Consequently, we must maintain sufficient power to defend our vital interests, and the outcome of the struggle in Asia may be viewed with a certain detachment." Your reviewer agrees with the stress on the importance of the Atlantic Community but does not believe the book makes a convincing case for a detached attitude toward Asia, or Africa—or a proof that retreat is common sense. It is useful to stress, as the author does, our difficult situation in the world. But it is questionable that we should accept massive strategic withdrawals without first trying to work through the unpredictable future with a policy of a global forward strategy.

There have been too few books since World War II on the political economy of national security. Professor Schlesinger's contribution is a needed milestone on a road too little marked by the efforts of scholarly analysis. It provides useful formulae for rational analysis, a negative debate brief, a type of catalytic agent, to stimulate questions in the minds of those who have accepted many of our policies, or the reasons for and against, without rigorous analysis. There is no more important area than national security for study and writing. What we really need is a "three-headed" type of scholar, able to integrate and adjust political factors and objectives, military strategy, and economic analysis.

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Oil and State in the Middle East. By GEORGE LENCZOWSKI. (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press. 1960. Pp. xix, 379. \$6.75.)

The past three years have seen a rise in the flood of writings about Middle Eastern oil. There has also been marked improvement. The impressionistic pieces of the late 1940's and the post-Abadan polemics are now being superseded by more careful studies. Typical are Stephen Longrigg's *Oil in Iraq*, Benjamin Shwadrán's *The Middle East, Oil and the Great*